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00:00:06

Christina Douglass: Good morning. Today is Monday, August 14, 2006.
We are talking this morning with Dr. Squire Brown. This interview is
being conducted in the studios in the Center for Teaching and Learning at
Wright State University as part of the Cold War Aerospace Technology
Archive Project. The interviewer is Christina Douglass. Thank you very
much for talking with us for a second time, Dr. Brown.

00:00:28

Dr. Squire L. Brown: My pleasure.

00:00:32

Douglass: Today I would like to touch on a topic that we discussed in our
previous interview, and I’d like to ask you a few questions on technology.
Wright-Patt Air Force Base was a center for technology, a term that
entered American vocabulary and has been used in a variety of ways.
During your time at Wright Field, how did you define technology and how
has that definition changed throughout the years?

00:00:58

Brown: That’s a very interesting question because the term ‘technology’
does not have a particularly precise definition. We had one way that we
interpreted it. Today in common American usage, it tends to imply
something having to do with electronics and computers. But for the
laboratories here at Wright Field, technology generally covered processes,
practices, tools, specific knowledge necessary to create a specific product.
For example, how to design a specific wing for a specific airplane.
Let me help to illustrate by describing three basic terms: science,
engineering, and technology. We begin with science, particularly physics
and chemistry, which teaches us about the basic world around us, the basic
phenomenology. We think of the properties of gasses, how they respond
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to temperature, pressure, velocity variations. Then we think about
engineering in which we are taught the principles of aerodynamics, for
example. How the planned form of a wing affects its lift and drag, what
we do about camber, skin friction, the viscous phenomenon, a parameter
such as Reynolds number. 1 And those are general knowledge that could
be applied to a broad range of wing design for airplanes. Then at the
laboratories, we would be concerned about creating tools and techniques
for specific designs. We had a specific airplane, mission, a fighter for
example, we need to design a wing for, so we were in the business of
creating tools for analysis of specific wings, and their handling of an ?
attack, and high speed flight. Then we would be concerned about
translating that into a wind tunnel model and wind tunnel testing, which
itself is a technology- big facilities, measurements, data reduction. And
then the technology of how to scale up the results, the measurements that
we took, how to scale those to apply to a full-scale airplane. So the
distinction between science, between engineering, the general principles
and the specific tools, we would regard the specific tools for a wing design
as part of the technology product.
00:03:28

Douglass: Your professional career coincided with the invention and
really the exploitation of an important technology, namely the digital
computer. Can you tell me what your earliest experience was with a
computer?

00:03:41

Brown: This is a favorite topic of mine because I was fortunate enough to
begin my professional education at a time when the general purpose
programmable digital computer was really becoming a tool that anyone
could use. The general purpose computer, we think of that as being
defined by something that had memory- today we would call it RAM in
our home computer- could be programmed for different applications.
Those became available around 1955. They were large, very expensive,
just a few of them made, but by 1960, as I began my undergraduate
education, some manufacturers were beginning to offer smaller, less
expensive models that were suitable for an undergraduate education. I
was attending the University of Texas at Austin- it’s a very wealthy
school, had plenty of money to buy things like new computers for their
students, and so the College of Engineering had a computer that was
available for undergraduates to use.
Now, in those days, there were no classes in programming, there
were no degrees in computer science. It was simply there was a machine
there and we were encouraged to try our hand at it, to just go over and
begin to teach ourselves programming, to begin to see how the computer
might be applied to engineering problems. Looking back on it, it was
quite exciting, quite fascinating because our professors themselves had no
experience with computers, had never programmed a computer, and yet

1

Reference for Reynolds number
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they recognized what the future would be and encouraged us to use it.
And our homework problems, to solve various, you know, term projects.
So the earliest computer I encountered was something called an
LGP-30, 2 appeared around 1960. It was operated by programming a
punched tape. The way you entered a program was first to code a
language, code the equations and punch those in on a tape, literally about a
three-quarter inch wide tape. You had to be very careful as you typed this
in because if you made any mistake whatsoever, then it was ruined and
you had to start all over again, so we all learned to be very careful typists.
We would enter these programs. You would get back off of the printerwhich was just a modified typewriter- just a string of numbers, and so you
had to be able to interpret then what those string of numbers meant. But it
was a marvelous device because it alleviated much of the routine drudgery
of repetitive calculations that are common to engineering. It also gave us
our first experience with the stored capacity of transcendental functionswe think of triganomic functions, logarithmic functions, and it was
necessary in engineering and up through the 1950’s for students and
practicing engineers to carry with them books of tables, mathematical
tables, gas tables- we lugged around to our classes these books of tables
that were nothing but if you looked at them, it would be just page after
page of numbers. And so whenever we had to look up the cosine of an
angle, we’d have to go to one of these books and look it up and read it
down- so all very tedious. Now, with computers, all of this begin to be
stored or have a subroutine in the computer that could calculate these
instantly. And we just thought that was just the most marvelous thing
we’d ever encountered in our life. We couldn’t imagine life ever being
any better then it was then, not having to look up angels in the math book.
So that was my very beginnings. It wasn’t long before we got a
computer where we could use punch cards, and that was a great
improvement because with a deck of cards, individual cards, the Hollerith
fields, if you made a mistake in punching one of those, it was a simple
matter to correct the one card and go on. 3 You didn’t have to worry about
restarting and doing it all over again. Computers progressed very rapidlyintroduction of solid state electronics and the university purchased some
big, powerful computers that were appropriate for scientific and
engineering work. These were huge machines, had to be housed in
specially designed buildings, particularly climate control. They were,
typically would have some big glass panel in front of them where people
would come—it was a tourist center—people would come and stand and
just look at this thing, all of these huge boxes and people tending to them.
So of course that’s all gone away now, but that was the time. And you
would take your deck of cards, the computer program that you wanted to
run, and you would submit it at a desk and the high-priest behind the desk
would disdainfully take your cards and take them back to be entered into
2
3
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the machine for processing. That could take several hours. You’d hand in
your cards, then go have lunch, maybe do some, attend a class. Then you
would later come back and by then, they would have the print-out, the
paper print-out available for you. You’d pick that up, you’d go back and
analyze the results and maybe make some changes to the program. This
may involve many trips across the campus. There was no such thing as a
remote terminal, there was no, you know, no real-time interactive
capability, but nevertheless, we thought it was just marvelous.
There were still no courses in computer science or programming as
we would know it today. We all had to teach ourselves programming,
generally Fortran. But some professors on the campus were beginning to
offer classes in new numerical methods. Professors were beginning to
realize that the power of computers could now begin to introduce tools
that had not been practical in the era of slide rules and pencil and paper
and handbooks. And so begin to take classes in new numerical methods,
such as learning how to invert a matrices, matrix- a matrix is a common
process in engineering, simultaneous equations, being able to invert a
matrix is very useful- and we could now begin to invert large matrix and
get very accurate results for that and evaluating new tools.
Then by the late ‘60’s, well, initially, computers replaced or just
were automation for existing engineering practices. Things we’d done
with slide rules, pencil and paper, we simply adapted to a computer, but as
you suggest, wasn’t long before we begin to get new ways of doing thingsbegin to offer new techniques and going back to the wing design problem,
by the late ‘60’s, we were beginning to get the first of the computational
aerodynamics, new tools that could enable us to do analytical wing design,
to achieve pressure distributions, new things we’d never been able to do
before. And computer technology progressed very rapidly- the power of
them, the cost of them. Begin to get into graphics and a large part of
engineering is doing drawings. In order to ultimately manufacture
something and create a product, you have to create drawings. These, in a
typical project would require literally dozens of draftsmen, people
working at drawing boards all day. Now that could be replaced, could be
automated and replaced by computer generated drawings- begin to change
the whole realm of productivity and became quite common even in the
early stages of the design project to begin to create a conceptual drawing,
illustrations quite easily without much time at all. Powerful, powerful
innovation.
I would say sometime around the 1980’s- late ‘70’s, early ‘80’s, a
new class of computers came along, something were called mini
computers, I believe. Large machines by today’s standards, but had the
great advantage of not requiring special facilities, not requiring, you know,
special floors and humidity and temperature control- it could just be put in
a common office. Still to be used by a group of folks, but could be located
in close proximity. Now we begin to interact with machine in real-time,
great productivity advantage. Graphics continued to advance very rapidly-
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wasn’t very long before we began to get color into the process. Color was
very useful for beginning to illustrate the internal components of the
airplane. Heretofore, even in the best of drawings, it was all pen and ink,
grayscale at best and simply reading a drawing was quite a challenge.
You had to be trained to do that. Now with graphics, the color, you could
generate illustrations that could quickly be understood by even the most
casual observer.
So that took us into the 1980’s. About 1985, we began to see the
first of the personal computers arrive- quite a novelty. But as we all know,
that technology advanced very rapidly. Pretty soon, there was a personal
computer on everyone’s desk. They were more powerful then those huge
machines of the 1960’s. Just seemed incredible that within a couple of
decades what the progress we had made. Ah, so now an individual
engineer could be his own design project and stored in the programs could
be all of the software for air dynamics, for propulsion, for weight
calculation, for performance estimations, whatever you wanted to do- all
of the graphics were there. So a single engineer with one of these new
computers on the desk could replace a project team of a dozen individuals.
A single person could accomplish in one week what it might have taken
several months for a team of ten or twelve engineers to do. So it just
changed the whole productivity side of it. I might add that, of course,
management is never satisfied [laughs] and so it wasn’t a simple matter of
“Well, we can do everything more quickly and more efficiently.” They
expectations then went up accordingly, and so we were expected to look at
many more options, many more designs. So the whole nature of both
what we could do and the expectations begin to change very quickly.
I guess by 1990, the computer began to change the basic structure
of the office, and how we did administrative tasks, how we filed, kept
records, and of course the introduction of the internet and communications
tools began to change everything. So it was very common then for
engineers to begin to take care of their own administrative tasks, to type
their own letters, to fill out their own forms, rather then handwriting these,
taking them to a secretary and having the secretary prepare it on paper.
Now with individual printers and the right software, you’d fill in the
blanks. Life in the office began to change very dramatically. So within
my professional career, the computer changed how we did engineering,
changed the office, changed expectations. It was, looking back on it,
really quite and exciting time.
00:17:22
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Douglass: During this time of very rapid technological advancement, how
willing were the higher-ups at your laboratory or at Wright Field in
general, in providing you with these new tools? Did you receive funding
for new computers, did you get the latest and greatest in technology? How
did you-, how did the powers that be integrate these new tools for the
engineers?
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00:17:48

Brown: That’s a wonderful question on culture and sociology [laughs] and
there were two parts to the answer. First of all, in just simply buying
equipment and facilities and the tools, that was rather straightforward.
Senior management, the Air Force in general, was willing to provide the
necessary resources to do that. There was no problem there. But there
was a generational issue, especially I can recall coming into the late ‘60’s,
early ‘70’s, with the more senior management who had not had much
experience with computers- really not quite sure what to make of them,
not very trusting of them, and so we had quite frequently to work very
hard to overcome kind of a culture barrier. If we would go forward with
some design projections, performance of an airplane, it was not unknown
for them to expect us to at least run a sample calculation or two the old
way- get out the slide rules and go through it just to assure themselves that
these numbers coming out of this box were not just made up somehow.
But gradually, they gained confidence in these new tools and what we
could do and just the natural progression of time, as folks in my generation
moved up we were more comfortable with the whole revolution that went
on.

00:19:28

Douglass: I’d like to turn to another important development that paralleled
the digital computer and that was systems engineering. You were an
aerospace engineer- what was a systems engineer and what was the role of
the systems engineer at Wright Field?

00:19:45

Brown: Systems engineering is a discipline that emerged after World War
II. Through the 1950’s, you had the classical engineering disciplines of
civil engineering, electrical, mechanical, aerospace- aeronautical, it was
called in those days. But by the 1950’s, the complexity of engineering
projects had created a demand for this new discipline called ‘systems
engineering.’ In its simplest terms, a systems engineer was an individual
who had some knowledge of each of the engineering disciplines across a
project, so in an airplane, in an aeronautical weapon system, they would
understand something about the air vehicle, about propulsion, about
avionics. Furthermore, they were trained in tools such as operations
research, again, new mathematical techniques that would help to
understand the allocation of resources.
Now, engineering is always about getting a cost-effective product.
You don’t necessarily end up satisfied with something that works- you
want to get something that is cost-effective as well. Through World War
II, it was fairly straightforward to design an airplane, such as a bomber,
and you produced a bomber that could carry a payload and fly sufficient
distances at a sufficient speed. And that was all that was necessary. It
could be done all within the domain of aeronautical engineering. But by
the 1960’s, disciplines in avionics and the necessary trade-offs in the
domain of performance created this need for the systems engineering.
Somebody who could integrate the full package- they might not have the
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depth of knowledge that any one of the individuals would require, they
might not understand all the esoteric [details] in a sophistication in an
electronic counter-measures package, for example, but they understood its
value and they had tools that would enable them to trade off the benefits of
an electronic counter-measures package versus greater speed, for example.
And it was their insight and their ability to manage very complex
programs, things that the modern weapon system represents, that made
them an essential discipline to the Air Force.
[TECHNICAL PROBLEMS (long break in tape)]
00:22:28

Douglass: Laboratories themselves do not have responsibilities for the
system developments. Did individual laboratories adopt systems
engineering practices?

00:22:40

Brown: The laboratories were the domain of technical specialists.
Specialists in aerodynamics or turbine engines, specialists in materials,
fuels, and so as a general rule, systems engineering was not a common
discipline within the laboratory. However, we did find it necessary to
have some capability in systems engineering. With the complexity of
weapon systems, we found it necessary to be able to articulate for
purposes of defending funding, to advocate advances in technology, we
found it necessary to be able to use tools from systems engineering to
explain how a particular technology would fit in with the future Air Force
and what its benefits might be. So in order to simply to communicate with
higher headquarters, to be able to defend project funding, we found it
necessary to use the language, sometimes the tools of system engineering
simply to be able to keep thinking on track. [Pause]
I should perhaps add that that was something that began to emerge,
again in the late ‘60’s, early ‘70’s. Coming out of World War II, there had
been a general consensus at the beginning of the Cold War that science
and technology were necessary for the nation’s superiority. And so for a
decade or more, it was kind of an unquestioned willingness to fund
technology just under the basic assumption that it all had to be good.
Beginning in the ‘60’s sometime, it began to change. It began with the
competition for funding, the realization that they needed a more
sophisticated investment strategy. It became necessary for the technology
organizations to begin to explicitly relate what they were doing and the
potential benefits to some future system.

00:25:09

Douglass: Dr. Brown, many books have been written about great
inventors, as well as successful corporate research laboratories. In these
books, it is often described that the evolution of a technology from
conception to product application to illustrate both the importance of ideas
and the complexity of bringing a technology to maturity. Now the Wright
Field laboratories were responsible for identifying new opportunities for
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military technologies. How did the engineers get new ideas and what was
the role of the labs in nurturing technology development?
00:25:48

August 14, 2006

Brown: As you suggest, there have been many books written on the
subject of invention and ideas and how to do it. And no one has come up
with a clear cut formula for doing this. Many corporate research
laboratories would like to have captured this in a process so that they
could consistently create new products that would make lots of money for
them. But it’s kind of an elusive quality. Ideas or originality is not easily
captured, not easily institutionalized. So ideas could come from
anywhere.
But let me begin this way- that the aerospace industry, particularly
the military aerospace industry that supplied products for the Air Force,
could be characterized as a national industry. So you had centers all
across the country- east coast, Midwest, the west coast. Centers where
there were manufacturing firms, commercial firms where there were think
tanks, where there were government agencies, not just the Air Force, but
across the spectrum of government agencies. And all of these represented
sources of new ideas, sources of articulating new possibilities and new
requirements. So there was a constant dialogue among all of these
organizations. You can imagine the kind of this vast network of
communication links across the country.
So in one important respect, it didn’t matter where you were
located, as long as you had a telephone, and later a computer, as long as
you could get on an airplane, it didn’t matter where you were located. It
was your ability to talk to the right person, to get stimulation or to convey
information in a timely manner. Typically- well, let me describe it this
way also: that what was important was the peer-to-peer connections. So
for a junior engineer assigned to a flight mechanics organization, it was
important for that person to know who his colleges were in Seattle or in
Fort Worth or in Washington, D.C. We talked among ourselves, and that
was ideas and stimulation and possibilities. If you looked at an
organization chart, it would look very hierarchical and it would appear that
I got my direction you know, from Air Force Headquarters that came
down to the laboratory commander and in turn came down to me. That
was not at all the case. Seldom got any kind of direction from the
laboratory commander. It was his job to go out and get funding and make
sure that we had the right facilities and the right opportunities, but the flow
of ideas in what we wanted to do came through this peer-to-peer network
and going to professional society meetings and exchanging information,
visiting with each other. Out of that stimulating environment would begin
to emerge, coalesce some specific project that we want to go do this, we
want to go test this wing, this new wing has some virtues that might serve
the next generation of fighters and so that’s the way we would go.
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00:29:44

Douglass: Well of course the Wright Field laboratories were not the only
federal research and development organizations. Were their labs in
competition with other agencies and how did the Air Force labs relate to
their counterparts, say in other services?

00:30:01

Brown: Again, if you looked at an organization chart, it would at first
appear, if you looked at the U.S. government and its various technology
organizations, it would look to you as though there was an uncounted
number of them- certainly a large number of them—located all across the
country, various agencies. And you might at first wonder why in the
world there were so many and how is it that they could possibly each be
doing something useful. That was a continuing challenge to us, to
articulate and to defend our uniqueness of what we should do.
So that might suggest some competition. But in fact, that was
really not the case. Each organization, the military sources, the Air Force
labs, the Navy Labs, the Army, served their customer base, which was the
operational services, in a unique way. So the Air Force had one kind of
mission, the Navy had another, the Army yet a third. So the laboratories
would first of all, tend to create products that their service could use. So
there’s not much competition in that sense.
Moreover, that very arrangement tended to stimulate a climate of
cooperativeness. Quickly learned that no one organization had all the
money they needed, and I suspect that this was deliberate, that if you
really wanted, really got serious about a project that required large
funding, it was necessary to go and enlist the support of these other
government agencies- NASA for example, or the Navy. It was very
common for the Navy, the Air Force and NASA to get together on some
specific project. Each of us brought a little bit to the table. We learned
how to cooperate, we learned to get mutual benefits out of it and as you
might imagine, that was, in the end, that was all very helpful. It really did
result in a better product at the end of the day by having this cooperation.

00:32:26

Douglass: During the Cold War, you and the engineers at Wright Field
and of course across the entire Air Force, were essentially producing a
product- being technology advancements, system designs, weapon
systems, to stay ahead of Soviet technology. Who was your customer
exactly?

00:32:53

Brown: We were, at Wright Field, Wright Patterson Air Force Base was
the center for aeronautical weapon systems, and so that component, those
components of the Air Force that operated airplanes represented a
customer base for us. So classically, that would have been the Tactical
Air Command headquartered at Langley-the tactical aircrafts, such as
fighters and attack aircraft. 4 The Military Airlift Command at Scott Air

4
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Force Base transport aircraft. 5 Those organizations incidentally have gone
away, and the Air Force has been reorganized. And then the Strategic Air
Command, to a lesser extent- the bombers, the long-range bombers. 6 I say
to a lesser extent because SAC did not buy airplanes with the frequencythey didn’t have a procurement cycle that was the same as the airlift
people or the fighter organizations. And then there were other lesser
organizations in search and rescue and the training command and
elsewhere. But anyplace that operated aircraft within the Air Force, we
regarded as a customer base.
00:34:09

Douglass: Was any one of those commands that you mentioned, TAC,
MAC, or SAC, were they, were any one of them regarded as more
important then the others?

00:34:22

Brown: We tended to, in terms of importance; we tended to focus on
Tactical Air Command and their needs, for a couple of reasons. The
turnover, the acquisition cycle for tactical aircraft, for fighters, intended to
be much shorter then for the other classes of aircraft, which stayed in
service literally for decades. So the evolution of technology for fighter
airplanes was on a much shorter scale than for the other class.
Furthermore, the high performance demanded by fighter aircraft, combat
aircraft, tended to draw technology much more vigorously then some of
the missions, some of the other aircraft types. [Pause]
I would also add that perhaps in the post-Vietnam Air Force, the
Air Force that emerged in the 1970’s, it came to be dominated by the
fighter generals- the senior leadership that emerged from a lot of tactical
experience in Southeast Asia where before that, the general officers
coming out of Strategic Air Command had dominated the Air Force. So
beginning in the ‘70’s, the leadership was more predisposed to tactical
aircraft, to fighters and looked more favorably on funding for those kinds
of systems.

00:36:00

Douglass: It has been suggested that successful technology development is
characterized by a network of participants rather then a hierarchal
structure. What was your impression of the path from concept to maturity
in relation to your work?

00:36:22

Brown: Everything began at a concept level- might be represented by an
individual or at most, two or three individuals, having some idea that
emerged perhaps in discussion say at a professional conference or a visit
to a contactor. Might be something that you could do literally on the back
of an envelope at your desk, sketch out a few ideas, begin to illustrate the
feasibility of it. And then you would begin to visit again this peer-to-peer
network. You would begin to visit perhaps with some staff officers at

5
6
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Tactical Air Command to kind of get their impression- again, this is not
the senior leadership. These are field grade officers, someone with about
your level of experience. And assuming that it all began to sound
reasonable there, you would begin to ask for additional support, additional
funding. That would take you into encounters with laboratory
management, with senior managers and contractor facilities perhaps.
Same thing would be happening with your counterparts at Boeing or
Lockheed. So you’re asking for a little more money, you’re needing a
little more support, a little more justification.
Before long, if the idea continued to show promise, you would
reach the stage in which some serious testing would be necessary, like
flight testing. You might want to modify an airplane, install additional
equipment and do some flight testing. Well by then, you really do have to
have the endorsement of the senior leadership at the customer base, say at
the Tactical Air Command headquarters. By then, you needed a general
officer to at least nod his head in the right direction, and say, “Yeah, we
need to get on with this.” Then you need air staff approval, then you’d
need to have matched up with some approved requirement- this couldn’t
be just a future pie-in-the-sky- this really had to connect with some stated
mission requirement. You worked with these other agencies. All of this
had the characteristics, the nature of again, a peer-to-peer network more
then a hierarchical structure. Eventually, you did have to have the
approval of the hierarchy, but that was kind of an integral part of the
development process of coming from the bottom up- seldom came from
the top down. Seldom did anything come out of the Pentagon down to
Wright Field and down to the engineer.
00:39:02

Douglass: Did the Air Force institutional structure allow for flexibility in
the event that a new idea cropped up?

00:39:13

Brown: During my career, I thought that the Air Force was wonderfully
understanding of the possibility of new ideas and new technology. And
we’d had the very dramatic experience during Vietnam, during the ‘60’s
Southeast Asia conflict, of the need to introduce new technologies and
new ideas to fulfill roles that we had not anticipated. I found that during
most of my professional career that the culture at Wright Field, the
leadership were understanding, willing to listen. Always with a critical
ear and critical eye because we were all in competition for resources- we
had to make decisions. There was, I never felt like I was being strained,
that there was a set of guidelines that came down that necessarily said,
“You should work on this and only this.” They were willing to entertain
ideas on their merit, wherever they came from.

00:40:37

Douglass: I think we established that the Cold War was of course a
wonderful time of technological development. And there must have been
some technologies that emerged as more important then other ones that
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perhaps were judged as mature or didn’t need any further development.
Can you provide examples of early Cold War technologies that perhaps
were superseded by different technologies in later decades?
00:41:09

Brown: One of the virtues of Wright Field and I think certainly one of the
virtues of this unique blend of military leadership and civilian specialists
was the constant willingness to entertain a change- that constant
realization what was good last year might not be good this year and that
something new might be necessary for next year. So a willingness to
discard the old to embrace the new I think was a hallmark, one of the real
strong points of Wright Field and the leadership there.
Certainly, probably one of the most dramatic illustrations of that
would be the contrast between high speed flight, supersonic flight and the
emergence of stealth, which is generally applied to sub-sonic airplanes,
slower airplanes. For a period of time early in the Cold War, it appeared
that aeronautical systems were going to rely upon maximum speed, very
high speed, several times the speed of sound, being able to fly Mach 2,
Mach 3 even. Speed had always been a virtue in military systems. In all
of their wartime experience it had appeared that the force having the
higher speed enjoyed an advantage. But in the 1960’s, that began to
change for a number of reasons: sophisticated air defense systems
characterized by radar and missiles, speed, utility of speed began to lose
out. The technology of stealth, that was called radar camouflage at that
time, being able to be invisible to radar, slowly began to emerge. It was
not readily apparent exactly, that that was going to be the case. Stealth
came out of the avionics community- individuals who understood how to
manipulate the electromagnetic equations. High speed coming out of the
aeromechanics discipline, so these were two different cultures, two
different ways of looking at the problem.
But the leadership was perceptive enough to see where the future
lay, to see the need to change the investment strategy and gradually to
build up the stealth organizations, to gradually decrease and eventually
terminate the funding for very high speed flight. Today’s Air Force is
characterized by the frontline airplanes like the B-2, the F-117, that are
sub-sonic airplanes, fly less then Mach 1. Airplanes that could fly several
times the speed of sound are museum pieces. Those changes all occurred
during my professional career.

00:44:26

Douglass: You discussed how the leadership was often willing to changeswitch gears or investment strategies. What were the specific tipping
points? Where there specific instances where they realized, “Oh we need
to go in this direction or we need to put our money here?”

00:44:44

Brown: Looking back on it with hindsight, yes indeed there were, there
were tipping points. Sometimes they came from perceptions of the
changing threat. The intelligence community would slowly over time
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begin to build up a picture of the Soviet Union changing their emphasis
and what they expected to do. Might take a while to build up, but
gradually, this would catch on. At the senior leadership level, those that
would have insight to this would compare what we needed to do, what our
investment strategy was, would eventually realize that we needed a new
suite of technologies, a new investment strategy.
Sometimes these tipping points came from acknowledgment of the
threat. Sometimes they came from cost pressures. The simple realization
that the way we were doing business or a specific system was simply too
costly to continue to sustain. The American public has the common
impression that we just spend lots and lots of money on defense, and we
do, but within the services themselves, there is an up-front priority
consideration of what they are spending to accomplish their mission and
they’re always looking for ways to do the job more effectively and at
lower cost. So over time, some kinds of systems would simply price
themselves out and we would move on to a different option.
00:46:34

Douglass: During the Cold War, the threat was the armed forces of the
Soviet Union. How did you learn about the capabilities of the Soviet
forces?

00:46:45

Brown: We learned about the Soviet Union, the Soviet Air Force through
particularly through the intelligence organization that was part of our Air
Force, at that time known as the Foreign Technology Division. They had
specific responsibility for evaluating Soviet aeronautical systems and we
would receive regular briefings from Foreign Technology. Today, I
believe they’re called the National Aerospace Intelligence Center; I think
they have a wider responsibility. 7 But they were very good at their job.
They had- I don’t know how they got it, but they had terrific insight into
the aircraft and systems that the Soviet Union was operating. Not only
their aircraft, but we received briefings on their air defense systems, their
missiles, their radars, all of the technical information. We knew with great
precision and with great confidence what the Soviet Union was doing.
[Pauses]
Let me amend this to elaborate just a little bit more. We also
occasionally would receive briefings on threat projections, briefings from
other organizations. Now, the American public tends to think of the CIA,
Central Intelligence Agency, as being, as representing the sum total of
knowledge about what’s going on in the wider world. We did
occasionally receive briefings from the CIA, but they were not particularly
relevant to what we were doing. Of greater importance to use were the
threat projections that came down from the Department of Defense that
might describe particular scenarios in which our Air Force would have to
operate. Now, those were approved scenarios at the highest level- if we’re
going to have a conflict in Western Europe, here’s the kinds of missions

7

Reference NASIC.
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we’re going to have to fly, and here’s the level of threat we’re going to
have to go against.
While these force projections, these scenarios were very credible,
at the same time, they also imposed certain constraints on our technology.
The Department of Defense at its highest level was not willing to entertain
alternative scenarios. Now, there was very good reason for that. They
needed to go to Congress and defend the budget and testify and so they
wanted to have everything tightly wrapped in a specific package that they
could defend and explain. But it did impose some limitations on the
possibilities for technologies. For example: we were off and on intrigued
by the possibility of having to go to the Middle East and fight in the
Middle East. In order to do that, it seemed advantageous to be able to
have aircraft with very long range- very long un-refueled range. But it
was difficult to get backing for such an aircraft because the possibility of
having to go to the Far East- oh excuse me, the Mid East, to the Persian
Gulf area, was not an accepted scenario.
Of course times change [laughs]. That’s a region of primary
interest to us today, but during the Cold War, the focus on was on the
Soviet Union and the Soviet Union alone. Even though Europe is
overseas, in terms of the demands on aircraft, it’s not that far away. It’s
very straightforward to get forces to Europe- much more difficult to get
forces anywhere else in the world. So intelligence worked both ways.
There was very good intelligence on the Soviet Air Force, their
equipment, but the approved scenarios that came down to us could
sometimes be constraining.
00:51:43

Douglass: Dr. Brown, I think at this time we’ll take a break.

End of Video Tape One
Start of Video Tape Two

00:00:00

Douglass: Dr. Brown, the Cold War really seemed to come at a very swift
end with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe in 1989 and
the obvious political disintegration in 1992. Did the Air Force anticipate
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War? Did you
foresee the end of the Cold War?

00:00:24

Brown: [Laughs] Without question, the great surprise of my life was the
end of the Cold War. It was completely unexpected, at least completely
unexpected by me and my colleagues. We’d grown up with the Cold War.
Going to school in the 1950’s, [I] vividly remember the all of the space
rivalry, the early ‘60’s, would go to these intelligence briefings in which
the Soviet Union just seemed to be this incredibly formidable nation.
There was never any hint whatsoever that there might be any problems.
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There were never any suggestions that the Soviet Union might even be
diminished as a threat, much less to go away. So we accepted the Soviet
presence in Eastern Europe, the threat they represented to Western Europe,
the potential threat anywhere in the world- might be represented by their
surrogates. We accepted that as a fact of life. Never heard any suggestion
whatsoever that there might be some political uncertainty or that economic
difficulties might begin to constrain Soviet power.
So when they began to withdraw, Gorbechev came in and, you
know, you had a sense that there was some thawing, some change which
was sort of interesting to watch, but when the Soviet forces began to
withdraw in 1989 from Eastern Europe, it was just the most astounding- to
go home and see these images on TV of people leaving- it was just the
most astounding sight I’d- I never expected to witness this. The collapse
of the wall, those images we saw on TV, I just, I was just riveted. I just
could not believe what I was seeing. And then finally, the complete
disintegration of the Soviet Union as a military force, never, in any of the
intelligence that we received, any of the official guidance that came downit was never even considered a possibility. One of the, for several years, I
just simply could not get over it. It just, the Cold War just seemed such a
fact of life.
I think a couple of years after the final collapse of the Soviet Union
in ’92, so it must have been ’94, ’95, some time around there, the United
Nations had a big conference, big celebration, an anniversary with
dignitaries, leaders arriving from all over the world and Wright Patterson
became an overflow holding place for the aircraft from these various
nations that were bringing their national leaders here. I recall driving by
the flight line and seeing what had been soviet aircraft, Soviet air transport
aircraft, now marked with the new Russian flag, parked on this historic Air
Force base. And you almost just could not believe what you were looking
at- to see Russian airplanes parked here, and you know, for peaceful
purposes. Later we began to have visits from the Soviet Union, pilots
flying Soviet air- [laughs] Soviet aircraft! They were now Russian
aircraft! It was through the mid ‘90’s, it was difficult to get your head
around, it was difficult to imagine that all of this had really happened.
00:04:37

Douglass: Dr. Brown, you retired in 1999, obviously two years before
September 11 and the beginning of the government’s current War on
Terror. Do you see any technology that perhaps you had a hand in
developing during the Cold War being used or improved during the
current War on Terror?

00:04:59

Brown: As a professional engineer, I have enormous confidence in the
profession and in the institutions to come up with necessary technology, to
come up with products that are going to make the world better. Make the
world safer, healthier, better. My whole career experience- I came into
contact with remarkable individuals. It was one of the joys, one of the
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pleasures of being able to move around the country and to encounter
stimulating individuals; individuals who could see the future, who could
articulate a vision, to give us guidance on what we should be doing. [I]
have ultimate confidence in our nation’s scientific and engineering
workforce to come up with necessary countermeasures, things that will
help us in all respects, and that not only concerns the very front page news
of terrorists. It concerns environmental problems, energy problems, the
whole scope, and I think that the stimulation from organizations, such as
Wright Field and the laboratories here- they’ll play a key role. These
same problems affect the Air Force, the military services. The
laboratories here have a distinguished record of cooperating and
supporting local institutions, so they are not an isolated island. They work
with local universities, they work with local companies, we have a strong
local workforce and that radiates out across the nation. I’ve every
confidence that out of this, we will get good products, good technology,
make us, make a better world for us in the future.
00:07:17

Douglass: Throughout your career, you have seen technology change
drastically, as we’ve been talking about, and many of your projects quite
literally take flight. I wonder if you could tell me the one project or one
experience that you had that really you are proud of or you look at it and
say, “We did that right,” or “I did this right.”

00:07:44

Brown: [Laughs] I have very much enjoyed working for the Air Force and
I appreciated the opportunities that it afforded me here at Wright Field. I
came here at a time, very fertile, the reemergence of aeronautical systems
as being important to the Air Force-the generation that led to the modern
Air Force of stealth and precision. I think the one project that dominated
my career- spent as much time on as anything- was what we know now as
the F-22, which its earlier form was known as the Advanced Tactical
Fighter. That program, long time, long gestation period. We were
working on some preliminary concepts as early as the late 1970’s. Almost
thirty years ago. Long time ago, considering that the airplane is just now
going into service. So through the late ‘70’s, into the early ‘80’s, we
debated requirements to aid in technologies for it. The program office was
formed in 1984. Prototypes flew- had a fly-off competition around 1990
and then there was the production award. So early in my career in the
Flight Dynamics Lab, played a part as just a ordinary line engineer, in
debating these concepts and by the time I retired as the Chief of Flight
Mechanics at the Engineering Directorate, I was responsible for engineers
in the- young engineers in the program office, solving problems on the F22. So the F-22, what Wright Field did for that, I think I would have to
use as an illustration of a career.
I’d also point out the interesting facet that this was a Cold War
system, an airplane created at the height of the Cold War. An airplane
designed to counter expected future developments in Soviet aircraft, and
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so it’s quite a sophisticated, quite a complex airplane. It’s relevance to the
world we live in today is a legitimate issue for debate- I have no insight on
how that debate should go. But it’s an illustration that the world does
change and it changes in ways we don’t expect, and you have to be quick
on your feet in this business.
00:10:48

Douglass: Dr. Brown, I notice you’re wearing your Air Force Museum
Volunteer pin. And I know that you volunteer quite regularly at the Air
Force Museum, not only in the Research Division, but as a tour guide,
often on the Heritage Tours. Do you find that explaining Cold War
mentalities or technologies to new generations- younger generations- what
is it you try to impart unto them as far as the lessons that were learned
from the Cold War?

00:11:30

Brown: I think that each of us who participates in the docent program and
takes visitors into the Cold War gallery who look at these enormous
airplanes that were the backbone of the nation’s deterrence- that it is a
challenge on the one hand try to convey to them what it was like in the
Cold War. Memories, it’s surprising, memories vanish very quickly,
people come of age with no personal reminiscences and even though the
end of the Cold War seems only a short time ago, many of the visitors that
we have, that we get have little personal recollection and virtually no
historical information to bring to bear. Using those big airplanes,
explaining about a time of nuclear deterrence, a threat that the Soviet
Union represented, it’s a challenge to them and quite frankly it’s
sometimes difficult for them to understand what it was like. The Soviet
Union represented a threat, completely- to me, completely different from
the kind of threat that-the terrorist threat that we are familiar with today.
It’s not uncommon for the average visitor looking at the big bombers to
just sort of shake their heads in wonderment and some disbelief that this
ever happened.

00:13:27

Douglass: Is there anything else you’d like to talk about that we haven’t
touched on today?

00:13:37

Brown: Christina, I think we’ve done a wonderful job of covering
technology and the role of Wright Field.

00:13:47

Douglass: Well, I certainly thank you for being apart of the Aerospace
Technology Archive Project. Thank you very much for your participation.
We appreciate it a great deal.

00:13:53

Brown: It’s been my pleasure, and we want to thank Wright State for
doing this.

End of Video Tape Two
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End of Interview Two
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